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What We Together Ought to Do*
Alexander Dietz
I argue that we have not only individual reasons for action but also collective
reasons for action: reasons which apply to us as a group. I next argue that if we
together have a reason to act, then I may have a reason to do my part, but only
when others will do theirs. Finally, I argue that collective reasons to do good can
never make a difference to what individuals ought to do, but that other kinds of
reasons can.
I. INTRODUCTION
When we think about what we should do, we are often thinking about
what each of us should do. But we can also think about whether there is
anything that we together ought to do. For example, consider the effect
that humans are now having on the global climate. It may be that, given
what everyone else is doing, no one of us is making things any worse. But
our combined activities are clearly doing harm. This fact might give us,
as a group, a reason to change our behavior.
In this article, I will ask two questions:
(1) What, if anything, do we together have reasons to do?
and
(2) If we together have reasons to act in certain ways, how, if at all,
does this affect what each of us ought to do?
* I would like to thank a number of people for their feedback and discussion, in-
cluding Stephen Bero, Renee Jorgensen Bolinger, Erik Encarnacion, Joe Horton, Nathan
Robert Howard, Nicholas Laskowski, Julia Nefsky, Alexander Sarch, Aness Webster, Ralph
Wedgwood, Christopher Woodard, the editors and referees at Ethics, and audiences at the
University of Southern California Speculative Society, the Rocky Mountain Ethics Con-
gress, Collective Intentionality IX, and the University of Rennes. I’m especially grateful to
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I will not offer complete answers to these questions here but will try to
make progress, building on work by Derek Parfit, Frank Jackson, Donald
Regan, Christopher Woodard, and others.1
In response to the first question, I will argue that groups do in fact
have certain reasons for action. More specifically, I will argue that, to a
limited but still significant extent, groups have reasons of the same kinds
as those which individuals have. These include reasons tomake outcomes
better, not to harm people in certain ways, and to benefit themselves.
In response to the second question, I will argue that if we together
have a reason to act in some way, then I have a reason to do my part, but
only so long as others will do theirs. I will therefore argue that we should
reject stronger claims advanced by Woodard and Jackson. In addition,
I will argue, my reasons to do my part should not add up with certain
similar reasons that I might already have.
I will then discuss what these answers imply. One natural aspiration
wemight have for a theory of collective reasons is to help support the con-
clusion that each of us should contribute to good causes such as prevent-
ing climate change, even when our own contribution would not make a
difference. But I will argue that in fact, our general collective reasons to do
goodmight never affect what eachof us should do. Still, I will argue, claims
about what we together ought to do are worth making even where they do
not have implications for individuals. And in some cases, I will argue, such
claims can have important implications for what each of us ought to do.2
II. PRELIMINARIES
Groups and Joint Action
We can start with some terminology. I will be using “group” and “we to-
gether” to refer to sets of persons, considered as units. Inmy general prin-
1. Compared with discussions of collective responsibility, and of the nature of col-
lective action, very little has been written on collective duties and reasons for action. Im-
portant exceptions includeDerekParfit’s discussion inReasons andPersons (NewYork:Oxford
University Press, 1984), sec. 26; his later “WhatWe Together Do” (unpublished manuscript);
and Frank Jackson, “Group Morality,” inMetaphysics and Morality, ed. Philip Pettit, Richard
Sylvan, and Jean Norman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 91–110. Donald Regan’s Utilitarianism
and Co-operation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980) and Christopher Woodard’s Rea-
sons, Patterns, and Cooperation (New York: Routledge, 2008) also discuss closely related issues.
However, in recent years, more work directly addressing collective duties and reasons for ac-
tion has started to appear, including Bill Wringe, “Collective Obligations: Their Existence,
Their Explanatory Power, and Their Supervenience on the Obligations of Individuals,” Eu-
ropean Journal of Philosophy (2014), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ejop.12076
/abstract; and a special issue ofMidwest Studies in Philosophy on “forward-looking collective
responsibility” (September 2014).
2. I am using “ought” and “should” in the “all-things-considered” sense, not in a more
narrowly moral sense. I will be assuming that we ought to do whatever we have the strongest
reasons to do but will not be assuming that what we ought to do is the same as what we have
an obligation to do, moral or otherwise.
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ciples, I will use them to refer to any set of persons capable of acting to-
gether in a certain way, specified below. I will not be referring only to or-
ganized groups or to related entities such as clubs, corporations, or sports
teams and will not be discussing issues specific to these kinds of groups.
Next, some assumptions. I will assume that it is possible for people
to intentionally act together. I will not endorse any particular account of
the nature of this kind of action.3 But I will assume that when wemake an
explicit, sincere agreement for us to carry out some plan of action, each
trusting the others to do their parts, and when each in fact does his part,
this is enough for it to be true that we have intentionally acted together.
I will use the terms “group action,” “joint action,” and “collective action”
to refer to action of this explicit-agreement kind, except when otherwise
noted.
I intend my normative claims to apply to those sets of persons who
can act together in this explicit way and will assume that the people in my
examples can act together in this way. But my claims will not be limited to
sets of persons who do ever act together in this way. That is, there might
be things that certain groups ought to do, even if they have never coordi-
nated in the past and will never coordinate in the future.
Collective Reasons
When we say that some group of people should act in some way, wemight
merely be saying that all or most of the members of this group should act
in this way. But when I talk about what we “together ought” or “together
have a reason” to do, or what a group of people ought or has a reason to
do, or our “collective reasons,” I will not merely be saying that all or most
of themembers of this group have reasons to do their parts in the relevant
course of action. As I will argue later, there can even be cases in which,
though you and I together have decisive reasons to act in some way, I have
no reason to do my part. And when we each do have reasons to do our
parts, this may be partly in virtue of the reasons we have as a group, rather
than the other way around. Rather, I will be talking about a kind of reason
whose bearer is the group itself.
In addition, I will focus on what collective reasons we have for acting
given the facts of our situation, rather than what reasons we have given
3. Leading accounts of collective action include those offered byMargaret Gilbert and
Michael Bratman. See Gilbert, “Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon,”
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1990): 1–14; and Bratman, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays
on Intention and Agency (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For more recent
treatments, see Gilbert, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2014); and Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). See also Christian List and Philip Pettit,Group
Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2011).
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our evidence or beliefs. So I will mostly ignore questions about what to
do when we don’t know all the relevant facts.
Collective Reasons and Collective Responsibility
It might be assumed that this article is intended to add to the extensive
literature that has been written on collective responsibility, which, as Tracy
Isaacs puts it, is typically understood in terms of “retrospective assess-
ments of the actions of collective agents according to which they are
blameworthy or praiseworthy.”4 But the notions of what we ought to do,
and of what we have reasons to do, are distinct from this notion of re-
sponsibility.5 For example, I might have strong reasons not to act in some
way even if, because the temptation is hard to resist, I could not be blamed
for doing so.
These issues may not be entirely independent. For example, some
of our strongest reasons for action may be tied to our moral obligations.
And it may be that we can be morally obligated to act in some way only
if we would be blameworthy if we failed to do so without an excuse. If so,
then significant questions about collective reasons for action will depend
on what, if anything, groups can be blamed for. Nevertheless, I will here
focus more directly on what groups have reasons to do.
III. WHAT SHOULD WE DO?
Are Collective Reasons Like Individual Reasons?
We can now address our first question: What, if anything, do we together
have reasons to do?
We can start to answer this question, I propose, by considering the
reasons that individuals have for acting, and asking whether groups might
have similar reasons. For example, if individuals always have a reason to
keep their promises, then groups might always have a reason to keep their
promises. There is a rangeof possibilities here. At one extreme, theremight
be full parity. The very same reasons might apply to groups and to individ-
uals. At the other extreme, the kinds of facts that give groups reasons for
actingmight be entirely unlike those that give reasons to individuals.
4. Tracy Isaacs, “Collective Responsibility and Collective Obligation,”Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 38 (2014): 40–57, 40. Some key articles on collective responsibility are collected
in Larry May and Stacey Hoffman, eds., Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in
Theoretical and Applied Ethics (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991). See also Peter A.
French,Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984);
Larry May,The Morality of Groups (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987);
and Christopher Kutz,Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2000).
5. Both Isaacs and Bill Wringe make a similar claim about the need to distinguish col-
lective responsibility and collective obligation. See Wringe, “Collective Obligations,” sec. 2;
and Isaacs, “Collective Responsibility and Collective Obligation,” 40.
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To defend a full-parity thesis, it might be argued that our ethical the-
ory should apply to all agents in the same way. Insofar as a group is an
agent, it must have the same basic reasons for action as any other agent.
While what groups and individuals have reasons to domight often differ in
particular cases, this will merely be due to differences in the circumstances
they happen to face.6
However, there also seem tobe fundamental differences between the
nature of an individual person and the nature of a group, and not merely
in their circumstances. And at least two such differences seem to have nor-
mative importance.
First, individuals are capable of certain mental states, including be-
liefs, desires, guilt, pleasure, pain, and continuous conscious experience,
mental states which many people take to be closely linked to our reasons
for action.However, itmight be pointed out, it is controversial whether or
in what ways groups have mental states of these kinds. And it is certainly
doubtful whether all groups who can act together have such mental states.
Second, individuals and groups do not seem to be capable of the
same kinds of relationships. For example, individuals might have reasons
for action related to love, friendship, and family relationships that could
not apply to groups. In addition, since groups, unlike individuals, have
members, certain kinds of groups, such as states or corporations, might
have obligations of justice toward their members that could not apply to
individuals.
Unless it can be shown that these differences are either illusory or
unimportant, I conclude that we should be skeptical of the claim that
the very same reasons apply to groups as apply to individuals. Therefore,
to fully understandwhat we together ought to do, we would have to figure
out which individual reasons do not apply to groups, and which reasons
groups have that are unique to them.
Nevertheless, in the following sections, I will offer arguments in
support of the idea that there is significant parity between individual and
group reasons. I will focus on three important kinds of reasons: reasons
to make outcomes better, to avoid harming people in certain ways, and
to benefit ourselves. I will assume, as many people believe, that we have
individual reasons to act in these ways. However, I will argue that there is
also significant evidence that we have collective reasons to do so.
I will support these claims, not by general considerations about the
sense in which ethical theory should apply to all agents universally, but
rather by focusing on cases. In order to capture our intuitions about these
cases, I will argue, it will not be enough to appeal to individual reasons.
6. I owe this suggestion to Mark Schroeder.
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However, we can capture these intuitions in a simple and satisfying way
by appealing to collective reasons of the relevant kinds. Therefore, these
cases represent significant evidence in favor of the claim that we have
these collective reasons.
Beneficence
Start with our reasons to make outcomes better. Most people believe that
each of us has some reason to do what will make things better. I claim
that, in addition, we together have such reasons. I will support this claim
with the following case described by Allan Gibbard.7 Suppose that you
and I each have two options, with outcomes as follows:
You
do A do B
I
do A Second-best Bad
do B Bad Best
Suppose further that the second-best outcome would be much worse
than the best outcome, and that the bad outcomes would be extremely
bad. We can call this Gibbard’s Case.8
As Derek Parfit writes, it is “in some sense obvious” that, other things
equal, we should both do B and bring about the best outcome.9 Likewise,
it seems to me in some sense obvious that we should not both do A, and
bring about the second-best outcome. But in what sense are these claims
correct?
On the account I will defend, these claims are correct in the sense
that we together ought to carry out the course of action in which we each
do B. We have decisive reasons as a group to carry out this course of ac-
tion, in virtue of the fact that we would together be making things better.
7. Allan Gibbard introduced a case with this structure in “Rule-Utilitarianism: Merely
an Illusory Alternative?”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1965): 211–20, at 214–15.
Donald Regan extensively discusses a version of this case inUtilitarianism and Co-operation.
8. For a more specific version of this case, imagine that you and I are industrialists who
have been asked to release our supplies of a certain chemical into the atmosphere (option
B), as doing so will reverse the effects of global warming. If we both refuse (option A),
global warming will proceed unchecked, causing millions of deaths. However, this chem-
ical has certain dangerous properties which are neutralized only when there is enough of it
dispersed throughout the air. The chemical will be harmless if we both release our supplies.
But if only one of us does, this will cause changes to the environment far more catastrophic
than the effects of global warming.
9. Parfit, “What We Together Do,” 11.
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And we together have decisive reasons not to do A, in virtue of the fact
that we would together be making things worse than they could be.10
This account, I will argue, has significant advantages over two alter-
native ways of accounting for Gibbard’s Case. On the first such alterna-
tive, we might try to show that we each ought to do B, and not A. Second,
we might make claims not about how we ought to do B and not A in the
usual sense, but rather about other things, such as about what merely
ought to happen, or about our motives. I will start by considering these
alternatives and showing how they fall short. I will then show that the
appeal to collective reasons can avoid these problems and can thus pro-
vide a more satisfying account of the sense in which we should both do
B, and not A.
Let’s start by considering noncollectivist accounts of the first type.
On these accounts, our sense that “we should both do B, and not A”
should be understood not as a claim about what we as a group should
do, but rather merely as equivalent to the conjunction of the purely in-
dividualistic claims that I ought to do B, and not A, and that you ought
to do B, and not A.
How could we explain why each of us should do B, and not A? Note
that it would not be enough to point to the effects of what each of us
would be doing. For suppose that we both do A. And suppose further that
each of us is stubborn and would do A regardless of what the other does.
In that event, we would each be making things as good as possible, given
what the other is doing. So appealing to our individual effects would not
explain why we should not do A.However, wemight find some alternative
explanation. For example, we might claim, with some rule consequen-
tialists, that each of us ought to do what, if everyone did it, would have the
best consequences.
However, even if we can find a plausible explanation of some such
kind, all accounts according to which each of us ought to do B, and not
A, are open to the following objection. Suppose that you will do A. In
that event, my doing B would make the outcome extremely bad. So it
seems clear that I should not do B. But the accounts we are considering
claim that “we should do B, and not A” in the sense that each of us
should do B, and not A. These accounts therefore claim that I should do
B, even though this would lead to disaster. That is unacceptable.
Rather than making the general claim that each of us ought to do B
and not A, wemight insteadmerely claim that I ought to do B if you do B,
but ought to do A if you do A. But again, this would not help to explain in
what sense we should not both do A.
10. In using Gibbard’s Case to support the idea of collective reasons to make out-
comes better, I am following a suggestion that Parfit makes, but ultimately rejects, in “What
We Together Do.” I discuss two of his reasons for rejecting this idea below.
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Let’s turn, then, to accounts of the second kind, which make claims
not about the rightness or wrongness of our doing A or B, but rather
about other aspects of the case.
First, in some versions of this case, it might be true that we would do
B just in case one of us suggests that we do so. As Parfit points out, in
these versions of the case, each of us would then have acted in the wrong
way by failing to make such a suggestion, in virtue of its consequences.11
However, this account will not succeed in other versions of the case.
If we are each determined to do A regardless of what the other says, then,
given the other, none of our prior choices would make things worse.
Next, it might be claimed that if we are each determined to do A
even if the other were willing to do B, then this reveals something bad
about our motives or character.12 And this, it might be suggested, can
explain our feeling that if we both do A, something has gone wrong.
However, this seems inadequate. It seems obvious, not just that we
should not be the sort of people who would do A, but also simply that we
should not do A.13
Another alternative is to claim that when we say that “we ought to
do B,” we are using “ought” in what is called the evaluative sense, rather
than the deliberative sense. Whereas the deliberative “ought” is closely
tied to particular agents, we use “ought” in the evaluative sense to make
more impersonal claims about what would ideally be the case, such as
“there ought to be less misery.”14 On this suggestion, in claiming that “we
ought to do B,” what we mean is that “it ought to be the case that we do
B.” This is roughly equivalent to claiming that it would be a good thing if
our both doing B is what happens.
However, this too seems inadequate. It might seem sufficient to
claim that it would be a good thing if our both doing B is what happens if
this were out of our control. But again, I am assuming in this and other
cases that we are capable of intentionally acting together. While it might
be out of my control whether we do B, it is not out of our control. So it
seems inadequate merely to think of our failing to do so as unfortunate.15
11. Ibid., 21–22.
12. Parfit makes this suggestion, ibid., 22.
13. This objection also applies to cooperative utilitarianism, a theory that Regan
proposes in order to address Gibbard’s Case (Utilitarianism and Co-operation, chap. 8). Very
roughly, this theory requires each of us to cooperate, with whoever else is cooperating, in
producing the best outcome. In order to “cooperate,” wemust not only act in the right ways
but also have the right motivations. If in Gibbard’s Case we both do A because we are both
uncooperative, then we will have failed to satisfy Regan’s theory, since we will have failed to
have the right motivations. However, we will not have done anything wrong: when you are
uncooperative, Regan would agree, A is the right thing for me to do, and vice versa.
14. See Mark Schroeder, “Ought, Agents, and Actions,”Philosophical Review 120 (2011):
1–41.
15. As Frank Jackson writes of different examples, “It is evident that something wrong
happens” in these cases, “but more than that is evident: something wrong isdone. (It would
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Finally, reconsider the collective reasons account. Again, this ac-
count claims that we together ought to carry out the course of action in
which we each do B in virtue of the fact that we would together be mak-
ing things better. And we together have decisive reasons not to do A, in
virtue of the fact that we would together bemaking things worse than they
could be.
These claims offer straightforward and what seem to me to be very
plausible explanations of both in what sense we should do B, and not A,
and why. In addition, they do not have counterintuitive implications. As
I will argue later, the claim that we together ought to act in some way
does not imply that each of us ought to do his part, no matter what. So
we can accept that we together ought to do B without claiming that I
ought to do B even if you do A. Finally, this account offers claims about
what we have decisive reasons to do now, rather than merely about our
previous acts, our motives, or what ought to happen.
I conclude, then, that Gibbard’s Case provides significant evidence
in favor of the idea that we have not only individual reasons to make out-
comes better, but also collective reasons to do so.
Harm
Consider next our reasons not to harm other people in certain ways,
such as by killing them.
It might seem that there is some prima facie reason to be skeptical
that reasons of this sort would apply equally to groups. Unlike our rea-
sons to bring about goodoutcomes, our reasons not toharmothersmight
derive from the relations in which we would stand to other people if we
acted in these ways. And there might be important differences between
the ways in which I can relate to someone and the ways in which a group
of people can relate to someone.
However, I will now argue that groups, and not only individuals, have
reasons not to harm people. I will support this claim with the following
case. Consider
Firing Squad: You and I each shoot some innocent victim, who
then dies. Our bullets both contribute to this person’s death.
However, either shot, by itself, would have killed.16
Finally, suppose again that we are each stubborn and would shoot re-
gardless of what the other does.
16. This is based on a case Parfit describes inReasons and Persons, sec. 26.
be quite wrong to think of either case as being one of a natural misfortune, like a flood)”
(“Group Morality,” 100).
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Now, because any one of our contributions would be enough, it is
true of each of us that whether our victim is injured or killed does not
depend on what we do. Nevertheless, in this case, it seems obvious that,
in some sense, we are doing something seriously wrong.
On the account I will defend, if we both shoot, we will together be
doing something wrong, either in intentionally carrying out this course
of action together, or in failing to stop ourselves from doing so individ-
ually. For we would together be killing this person. This fact gives us as a
group a strong reason to avoid this course of action.
Again, it might be claimed that we can account for the wrongness of
what we would be doing purely in terms of our individual duties and
reasons for action. I will consider two possible accounts of this kind. I will
then argue, again, that the collective reasons account enjoys significant
advantages over these alternatives.
One purely individualistic account could go as follows. First, even
if our victim’s death does not depend on what either one of us does, it
could be argued, at least one of us must still have killed this person—that
is, at least one of us must in fact have caused this person’s death. Other
things equal, we might believe, it is wrong to kill someone, even if we do
not hasten this person’s death. So, we might claim, if I turn out to be the
killer, then this makes what I have done wrong. And you may have acted
wrongly insofar as you risked being the killer. Or we might each have
caused this person’s death, and so we might each be killers.
However, even if killing that does not hasten death is objectionable,
it seems less serious than the other kind. Suppose that
two hospital patients are dying of some disease. There is only
one drug that would have any effect. It would cure this disease,
but it would also kill these patients painlessly at the exact mo-
ment that the disease would have done so. However, the drug
would also make their organs safe for transplantation. While
the patients have no objection to donating their organs, they
refuse to take this drug. But if their doctor gives them this drug
anyway, she could save someone else’s life.
We might normally find killing unacceptable, even when it would pre-
vent other deaths. But it at least seems open to question whether the
doctor should give her patients this drug. So it seems that our reasons not
to perform even two killings that do not hasten death must be weaker
than our reasons not to perform a normal killing. And if this is so, then
even if, in Firing Squad, we both turn out to be killers, the fact that we are
committing two killings that do not hasten death does not seem to be
enough to capture what wrong is being done. Again, what we are doing
seems to be seriously wrong.
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It might next be suggested that even if we want to explain this case
solely in terms of individuals’ reasons for action, we do not have to ground
these reasons in facts that are only, in a narrow sense, about these indi-
viduals. Parfit uses a firing-squad case to support the following claim:
Even if an act harms no one, this act may be wrong because it is
one of a set of acts that together harm other people.17
Parfit’s proposal does not explicitlymake claims about what groups ought
to do. This proposal thus allows us to appeal to facts about what we to-
gether do without relying on the unfamiliar notion of collective reasons
for action. In this way, we can think of this proposal as occupying amiddle
ground between a purely individualistic account of Firing Squad, and a
collective-reasons account of the kind I will describe below.
However, it is unclear whether this middle ground is tenable. For it
is unclear whether this proposal, unaided by an appeal to collective rea-
sons not to harm, can offer a convincing explanation of why it would be
wrong for each of us to shoot. On this proposal, if we both shoot, then:
(1) I will be acting wrongly, becausewewill together be harming
others.
If we accepted the claim that we have collective reasons not to harm
others, we could expand this to become:
(2) I will be acting wrongly, becausewewill together be harming
others, and so will together be acting wrongly.
But if we reject (2), then (1) seems undermotivated. It seems unclear why
my action should be criticizable in virtue of its part in some larger activity,
if there were nothing wrong with that larger activity itself.
It might be replied that we can criticize our larger set of acts simply
by saying that it is a bad thing that these acts are performed. On this
suggestion, the wrongness of my shooting derives from the fact that what
I did would be a part of something bad that happens, rather than of
something wrong that is done.
However, this seems implausible. Suppose that
I suffer from a genetic condition that causes my body to pro-
duce too much of certain chemicals. My favorite food also con-
tains these chemicals, and if I ate this food, the chemicals from
it would combine with the chemicals from my body to produce
painful symptoms. But because my body already produces more
17. Ibid., sec. 26.
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than enough of this chemical to cause these symptoms, eating
this food would not make me feel any worse.
It seems very implausible that these facts could make it wrong for you to
offer me this food.
This case suggests that the harms that we produce together with
other people must be criticizable in some way that does not apply to the
harms we produce together with natural or inanimate causes. And it
seems to me that the most natural criticism we could make is that if we
together harm other people, we will together be acting wrongly.
This leads us to the collective-reasons account of Firing Squad.
Again, on this account, we together have a strong reason to avoid shoot-
ing. For if we both shoot, we will together be killing our victim. (This is true
whether or not this killing will count as an intentional collective action.)
Moreover, our combined actions will hasten this person’s death.
Since our combined actions do hasten our victim’s death, this ac-
count seems capable of capturing what is seriously wrong about what we
are doing. In addition, unlike the Parfit proposal, this account offers a
straightforward and plausible explanation of why what we are doing is
wrong.
I conclude, then, that Firing Squad provides us with significant ev-
idence in favor of the idea that we have reasons not to harm people in
certain ways, not only as individuals, but also as groups.
Self-Interest
Consider finally our reasons to benefit ourselves. Here parity between
individual and collective reasons might seem especially unlikely. Cases in
which I benefit myself, and cases in which we together benefit ourselves,
differ with respect not only to the agent but also to the beneficiary. And
if groups can be said to have a welfare at all, it might be thought, this must
be a very different sort of thing from the welfare of an individual.
Despite these differences, I will now argue that groups, as well as in-
dividuals, may have self-interested reasons. This claim, I will argue, is sup-
ported by the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where we must each choose
whether to benefit the other at some lesser cost to ourselves. This case has
the following structure:
You
benefit me harm me
I
benefit you Second-best for each Best for you, worst for me
harm you Best for me, worst for you Third-best for each
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Suppose finally that, unlike in Firing Squad, the relevant harms here
would not involve killings or other kinds of actions thought to be spe-
cially prohibited.
Discussions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma often assume that we can-
not currently communicate and must each decide whether to harm the
other. But suppose instead that we can communicate and agree to harm
each other. This may seem, in some sense, crazy, at least to some of us. It
may seem that, in some sense, we must have some reason not to harm
each other, given that there is another course of action that would be
better for both of us. If this is right, then how can we explain in what
sense this is true, and why?
Note first that we could not explain why we have some reason not to
harm each other in virtue of the reasons that we each have to do what is
in our own interest. Whatever you do, benefitting you would make me
worse off.
Wemight next claim that we each have altruistic reasons not to harm
the other. If my acting in some way would make someone worse off, we
might claim, this fact in itself gives me a reason not to act in this way.
This suggestion is very plausible. However, it does not seem to be
enough to capture what is going wrong. What we are doing seems to be
not merely unfriendly, but self-destructive.
Next, as in the discussion of Gibbard’s Case, wemight focus on prior
acts, or claim that what happens is merely unfortunate, or reveals some-
thing defective about our characters ormotives. However, wemight think
that in choosing to harm each other rather than benefitting each other,
what we are doing is itself wrong. And as before, these suggestions do not
support the idea that we are making the wrong choice.
Finally, we could claim that we together have a reason of some kind
not to carry out the course of action in which we harm each other, since
this would be worse for both of us. Such an account might offer a
straightforward and plausible way to make sense of the idea that we have
some reason not to harm each other, and why. In addition, such an ac-
count might make sense of the idea that we have some reason not to
harm each other not only for altruistic reasons, but also because doing
so would be self-destructive.
Now, to develop this proposal, it might be suggested that the same
ultimate self-interested reasons apply to groups and individuals alike. In
other words, it might be suggested, our underlying principle should be
that each agent has a reason to do what benefits that agent. On this view,
our collective reasons to benefit ourselves would be reasons to benefit us
as a group.
However, philosophical theories of group welfare have not yet, to
my knowledge, been developed as thoroughly as theories of individual
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welfare. And again, given the important differences between individuals
and groups, it might turn out that the welfare of a group is a very dif-
ferent sort of thing from the welfare of an individual. So until theories
of group welfare are more fully developed, it seems premature to claim
that groups and individuals have the same fundamental self-interested
reasons.
But even if groups do not have the same reason to benefit them-
selves that individuals have, this does not mean that they do not have self-
interested reasons at all. Instead, I propose that we can take the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma to suggest that a similar reason applies to them. In
particular, I propose, we can simply claim that when acting in some way
would be better for all of us, this fact gives us a collective reason to act in
this way.
Conclusion
I have now argued that there is significant evidence to support the idea
that groups, like individuals, have reasons to make outcomes better, to
benefit other people, to avoid harming other people, and to benefit them-
selves. This is strongly suggested, I have argued, by Gibbard’s Case, by the
Firing Squad, and by the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Thus, I conclude, we have
good grounds to think that to a significant, though limited, degree, the
kinds of reasons that apply to groups are the same as those that apply to
individuals.
IV. WHEN SHOULD I PARTICIPATE?
Introduction
Somuch for the question of what groups have reasons to do. We can now
turn to our second question: If we together have reasons to act in certain
ways, how, if at all, does this affect what each of us ought to do? Do in-
dividuals have any group-based reasons for action: reasons to do our parts
in what we together ought to do, deriving from the group’s reasons to
perform this collective act?18
In what follows, I will first describe one intuitively appealing prin-
ciple of group-based reasons and show that this principle faces several
significant objections. These objections suggest that our principle should
not apply in noncooperative contexts, should allow for the possibility that
members have independent reasons for action, and should not allow for
an objectionable kind of double-counting. I will then propose a principle
18. I take the phrase “group-based reasons” from Christopher Woodard, whom I
discuss below. However, Woodard uses this phrase to refer to reasons an individual might
have to do her part in actions that a group containing her could perform, in virtue of the
good or bad consequences of those actions, rather than in virtue of the group’s reasons for
action, which might not all derive from consequences (Reasons, Patterns, and Cooperation,
chap. 2, sec. 2).
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that meets these conditions. Finally, I will list some remaining questions
about when we have reasons to do our part.
Just as I do not claim to have offered a full account of collective
reasons, I do not claim that the principle I propose represents a com-
plete account of group-based reasons. My goal is only to make progress.
The Simple Principle
Here is an initial proposal about how what we together ought to do can
influence what each of us should do. According to
the Simple Principle : If we together ought to act in some way,
then each of us ought to do our part. And if we together ought
not act in some way, then each of us ought not do our part.
This is a natural answer. As I will now show, however, it is open to sig-
nificant objections. By revising this principle so as to avoid these objec-
tions, we can try to get closer to the truth.
What If Others Don’t Cooperate?
First, note that Simple Principle tells me to do my part even when others
will not do theirs. This makes this principle vulnerable to two objections.
First, if others won’t cooperate, my contribution can seem pointless.
This is especially apparent in cases where my own contribution is some
mundane task with no special significance apart from the role that it
would play in the group activity. For example, suppose that we ought to
paint a house together, and my job is to mix the paints.19 The Simple
Principle implies that, even if you abandon the project, and I can’t do it
by myself, I still ought to mix the paints. But it seems pointless for me to
spend my time doing this.
Second, if others won’t cooperate, my contribution could lead to
disaster. Suppose again that we are in Gibbard’s Case and ought to both
do B, thereby producing the best outcome. The Simple Principle implies
that, even if you will do A, I still ought to do B. But again, doing this would
make the outcome very bad.
Christopher Woodard suggests that when others will not cooperate,
while it may not always be true that we ought to do our part anyway, we
may still have some reason to do so.20 Thus, on
Woodard’s Principle : Even when others will not do their parts in
what we together ought to do, I may still have some group-
based reason to do my part.
19. Michael Bratman discusses a similar example in “Shared Cooperative Activity,”
Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 327–41.
20. Woodard, Reasons, Patterns, and Cooperation.
Dietz What We Together Ought to Do 969
This content downloaded from 132.174.255.003 on June 22, 2016 13:47:32 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
While Woodard claims that the uncooperativeness of others does not
prevent me from having some reason to do my part, he leaves open the
possibility that there may be other constraints on when we have group-
based reasons.21 However, he suggests that we do have group-based rea-
sons in many actual noncooperative contexts.
Woodard argues that the idea that we have such reasons even in
noncooperative contexts is the best explanation of the intuitive tension
we feel between being “principled” and being “pragmatic.” For example,
in Bernard Williams’s famous Jim and the Indians case, Woodard writes,
Jim seems to have both reasons to accept Pedro’s offer to shoot one of
his Indian captives, so that Pedro will let the other nineteen go, and rea-
sons to decline the offer, and not shoot.22 These latter reasons, Woodard
suggests, are the reasons that Jim has to do his part in the best group
course of action, in which neither Jim nor Pedro shoots anyone. And Jim
still seems to have these reasons even though Pedro is unwilling to co-
operate in that course of action.
However, Woodard’s Principle faces two objections.
First, this principle implies that even if you abandon our house-
painting project, I still have some reason to mix the paints, unless this
situation would fail to satisfy some other constraint on when we have
group-based reasons. Therefore, this principle implies that, if there is no
independent constraint that applies here, and if I have nothing better
to do, then this is what I ought to do. But again, it seems that I have no
reason to do this.
Woodard’s Principle seems more compelling when my part consists
in not killing anyone than when it consists in mixing paints. But this, I
suggest, may be because the idea that I always have some reason not to
kill anyone is independently plausible and supported by other plausible
theories.23 In contrast, it is not plausible that I always have some reason
to mix paints.
Now, to avoid this objection, Woodard might restrict his principle to
cases where our group action is morally required, rather than merely a
useful project.24 However, as I will now argue, even if he does make this
restriction, Woodard’s proposal is still vulnerable to a second objection:
the most natural ways to develop this proposal still imply that we should
act in ways that lead to disaster, and it is not clear whether Woodard
could avoid this implication in a principled way.
21. Ibid., chap. 5, sec. 5.
22. Bernard Williams introduces this case in “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” in Utili-
tarianism: For and Against, ed. J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1973), sec. 3.
23. Woodard offers forceful objections to several of these alternative theories. While I
do not think these objections are decisive, it would take us too far afield to discuss them
here.
24. I owe this suggestion to an anonymous reviewer.
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To start, if I can have some reason to do my part even in nonco-
operative contexts, how strong would this reason be? It seems that the
reason would have to be proportional to the strength of our collective
reason to cooperate. If I have a group-based reason to mix paints, it
seems this must be weaker than Jim’s group-based reason not to shoot,
since the stakes are so much lower.25 If this is right, then we might claim:
The strength of my reason to do my part in noncooperative
contexts is some proportion of the strength of our collective
reason to cooperate.
But even if this proportion is very small, this principle, together with
other plausible normative views, can imply that I ought to do my part
even when this would lead to disaster.
For example, suppose that we face another version of Gibbard’s
Case. In this version, a million lives are in danger, and we have the fol-
lowing options:
You
do A do B
I
do A One hundred saved All die
do B All die All saved
It seems plausible that, if we are in a position to save lives, either together
or individually, then other things equal, the strength of our reasons to
do so will be proportional to the number of lives that would be saved.
Let’s say, then, that if we could saven lives, we have a reason of strength n
to do so. If so, then we together have a reason of strength 1,000,000 to
both do B. Now suppose that my reason to do my part in noncooperative
contexts is only one thousandth as strong as our collective reason to act.
Then if you do A, I will still have a group-based reason of strength 1,000
to do B. And since I only have a personal reason of strength 100 to do A,
this means that I ought to do B, even though I will be letting one hun-
dred people die, and saving no one.
Now, we might be skeptical that the strength of reasons can be
quantified so precisely. But we can also state the problem without relying
on precise numbers. There are some versions of Gibbard’s Case, we can
claim, in which our reason to cooperate will be extremely strong, but in
which you refuse to cooperate. So if the strength of my reason to do my
25. I should emphasize that Woodard does not himself make this claim.
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part is some proportion of the strength of our collective reason, however
small, this reason could still be very, very strong. It could thus be strong
enough even to outweigh the personal reason I have against doing my
part, deriving from the fact that this would lead to disaster.
To avoid this implication, Woodard might set an upper bound on
the strength of our reasons to do our part in noncooperative contexts.26
However, this seems ad hoc. In addition, where exactly should we set this
bound? Setting the bound at any particular strength seems arbitrary.
Therefore, while the idea that we have some reason to do our part even
when others won’t cooperate does not entail that we should act in ways
that lead to disaster, it is not clear whether there is any principled way of
avoiding this conclusion.
Finally, Woodard might again suggest that there may be some other
constraint on when we have group-based reasons which applies to cases
like the one described above. If some such constraint applies here, Wood-
ard might claim, then I may have no reason to do my part. For example,
Woodard might plausibly claim that I have no reason to do my part if I
would thereby let one hundred people die. Woodard could then adopt
some nonarbitrary proposal about the strength of the group-based rea-
sons that we do have, in cases where no such constraint applies.
However, recall that Woodard’s main argument in favor of the idea
that we can have group-based reasons even in noncooperative contexts
focused on the case of Jim and the Indians. Our intuitions about this
case, Woodard argues, are best explained by the hypothesis that Jim has
some reason to do his part in the course of action in which neither he
nor Pedro shoots anyone. This is true, Woodard claims, despite the fact
that if Jim does his part and refrains from shooting one of the captives,
Pedro will kill them all. But if Jim has some reason to do his part even
when he would be letting nineteen people die, it seems that the fact that
I would be letting one hundred people die could not prevent me from
having a reason to do my part in Gibbard’s Case. Nor does it seem that
the lives that we would be saving if we both did B could prevent me from
having a reason to do my part. So it seems that there is no plausible
constraint on group-based reasons that applies to this version of Gib-
bard’s Case but does not apply to Jim and the Indians.
Thus, both the Simple Principle and the weaker view that we have
some reason to do our parts even in noncooperative contexts can imply
that we ought to act in ways that seem pointless or that would lead to
disaster, and it is unclear if there is any principled way to avoid this. So we
should restrict our principle to cases where others are willing to coop-
erate. Frank Jackson proposes one such principle. According to Jackson,
26. Again, I should emphasize that Woodard does not himself make this claim.
972 Ethics July 2016
This content downloaded from 132.174.255.003 on June 22, 2016 13:47:32 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
If a group act is right, and it is in fact performed, then each individual
constituent act is right.27
Or, equivalently, according to what we can call
Jackson’s Principle: If we together ought to act in some way, and
we will act in this way if I do my part, then I ought to do my
part.
We might also add that if we together ought not act in some way, but will
act in this way if I do my part, then I should not do my part.
Independent Reasons
Again, the Simple Principle claims that if we together ought to act in
some way, then each of us ought to do our part. As we just saw, both this
view and Christopher Woodard’s weaker principle face objections aris-
ing from the possibility that others might not do their parts. Jackson’s
Principle avoids these objections, since it is restricted to cooperative con-
texts. But I will now argue that this principle faces another objection,
which can be brought out in the following case.
Suppose that
you and I are about to carry out a rescue mission to save the
lives of two strangers in imminent danger. But I then learn that
my child’s life is also in danger. If I continue with our rescue
mission, there will not be enough time to save my child.
Here, wemight think, I do have a special reason to savemy child, stronger
than my reasons to help save the strangers. So I ought to save my child.
But we might think that we as a group don’t have any special reason to
save my child. After all, my reason for acting might derive from the fact
that this is my child, and this fact might not apply to the group. So, we
might think, we as a group only have reasons to do whatever would save
the most lives, and so ought to save the two strangers. Jackson’s Principle
seems to imply, then, that I ought to do my part in our rescue mission,
even though I would be letting my child die.
As this case illustrates, since Jackson’s Principle claims that I always
ought do my part in reasonable group acts, this view ignores the possi-
bility that I may have other, stronger reasons for action that are not
shared by the group.28
Now, it might be suggested that what a group has reasons to do can
in fact be affected by special individual reasons of this kind. For exam-
27. Jackson, “Group Morality,” 107.
28. I owe this point to Jacob Ross.
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ple, it might be claimed that a group has a special reason to save the
child of any one of its members, just as strong as themember’s individual
reason.29 More generally, it might be claimed that even if I have a reason
to bring about some outcome in virtue of some fact that does not apply
to a group to which I belong, this might always provide the group with a
reason to bring about this outcome. And if there is this sort of “upward”
transmission of reasons from members to groups, it might be argued,
then cases like the one above do not in fact raise a problem for Jackson’s
Principle, since special individual reasons will already be reflected in the
group’s reasons.
However, while suggestions of this kind are worth considering, they
also seem open to question. For example, while I may have strong rea-
sons to make sure that I keep my promises, it is not clear that any group
to which I belong has equally strong reasons to make sure that I keep my
promises. In addition, “upward transmission” seems especially unlikely
in groups whose members have no prior relationships with each other.
But recall that the examples that I used to argue for collective reasons
did not rely on any details about the prior relationships between group
members. If these arguments were sound, then, it seems unlikely that
upward transmission is a feature of all groups that have collective rea-
sons for action.
Thus, our principle of group-based reasons should at least leave
open the possibility that individuals have independent reasons for ac-
tion that are not shared by the group, or that are otherwise reflected in
the group’s reasons. We can do this by switching to a weaker principle
about what we merely have some reason to do, rather than about what we
ought to do, all things considered. I therefore propose a fourth princi-
ple of group-based reasons,
P4: If some fact about our acting in some way gives us a reason
(not) to act in this way, and we will act in this way if I do my
part, then I have a reason (not) to do my part.
Double-Counting
I have argued that our principle of group-based reasons should apply
only in cooperative contexts, and that this principle should be stated as a
claim about reasons, so as to allow for independent individual reasons to
act in other ways. Therefore, I argued, we should reject both the Simple
Principle and Woodard’s and Jackson’s alternative principles, and instead
consider accepting P4. However, I will now argue that P4 faces another
objection and thus needs to be qualified with one additional claim.
29. I owe this suggestion to Julia Nefsky and to an anonymous reviewer.
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The objection can be illustrated with another rescue case. Suppose
that
two people are in imminent danger. I could help you to save
one of these people or could save the other on my own. But
there is not enough time to save both.
Suppose we believe that any person or group has some reason to act in
such a way that a life is saved. Then the fact that a life will be saved if
I help you gives me some reason to do so. But we will also be together
acting in such a way that a life is saved. So P4 implies that I have not only
a personal reason to help you, but also a group-based reason to help, be-
cause I would thereby be doingmy part in our rescuemission. But it seems
implausible that I could have stronger reasons to domy part in our rescue
mission than to save the other person’s life, merely on the grounds that
our rescuemissionwould involve cooperation. I shouldn’t have extra reason
to dowhat will bring about some outcomemerely because I would thereby
be playing a part in a group act that would achieve the very same thing. So
in this way, P4 seems to double-count our reasons for action.
This may seem to be a minor technical problem. But as I will argue
later, the need to avoid double-counting has important implications.
To avoid this objection, I propose that we combine P4 with the fol-
lowing proviso:
If by acting in some way I would be doing my part in multiple
acts, then the personal and group-based reasons I have deriv-
ing from any given feature of the outcome will not add up.
For example, by helping you to rescue someone, I am acting in such a
way that this person’s life is saved. And by carrying out our rescue, we are
acting in such a way that this person’s life is saved. But the reasons given
to me by these acts should not add up.30
In claiming that our group-based reasons should not add together
with my personal reasons in such cases, I am not claiming that we do not
have group-based reasons in these cases. Rather, we can think of these
two kinds of reasons as overlapping.31 To justify our actions, we could
appeal either to our individual reasons, or to our group-based reasons,
or to both. We just shouldn’t claim that these reasons combine to make
this justification extra strong.
30. Mark Schroeder has also argued that there are other kinds of reasons which
should not add up, because they are not independent in the right way. See Slaves of the
Passions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), sec. 7.1. It seems plausible that two
reasons given by the very same feature of an outcome might similarly not be independent
enough to add up.
31. I owe this image to Abelard Podgorski.
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Remaining Questions
P4, I have argued, avoids implausible implications in noncooperative
contexts, allows for members to have independent reasons to act in
other ways, and can avoid double-counting. I therefore offer this prin-
ciple for your consideration.32
There are at least three other important sets of questions about our
group-based reasons which I will leave open.
First, how strong are our group-based reasons? Can we compare the
strength of a collective reason with the strength of an individual reason?
If so, is the strength of my group-based reason some function of the
strength of the collective reason from which it derives? Is my reason as
strong as the group’s reason? Or is the strength of the group’s reason
divided among the group’s members?
Second, do group-based reasons depend on whether the group will
intentionally act in the relevant way? If we have not agreed to act to-
gether, but the others will just happen to “do their parts” for their own
reasons, could this be sufficient for me to have a group-based reason to
do my part?
Third, are any of our collective reasons essentially contrastive? That
is, are there any collective reasons that are essentially reasons for the
group to act in one way rather than another?33 If so, how, if at all, do these
transmit to the group’s members?
These questions represent promising topics for further reflection.
But for now, I will turn to the implications of P4 and my earlier claims
about where there is parity between individual and group reasons.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Introduction
I earlier argued that there was limited, but significant, parity between
individual and group reasons. In particular, I argued, if we have indi-
vidual reasons to make outcomes better, to avoid harming people, and to
benefit ourselves, then we also have collective reasons to do so. And in
the previous section, I proposed
32. P4 requires at least one further qualification: when determining the group’s
reasons for the purpose of determining my group-based reasons bearing on some set of
options, we should not take into account which of these options I will or would choose.
This claim is needed in order to prevent what I ought to do from being indirectly affected
by what I will or would in fact do. Also, Jacob Ross has pointed out in correspondence that,
without this claim, there are some cases in which P4 could imply that I have unfulfillable
obligations.
33. Compare Justin Snedegar, “Contrastive Reasons and Promotion,” Ethics 125 (2014):
39–63.
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P4: If some fact about our acting in some way gives us a reason
(not) to act in this way, and we will act in this way if I do my
part, then I have a reason (not) to do my part,
together with the proviso that
If by acting in some way I would be doing my part in multiple
acts, then the personal and group-based reasons I have deriv-
ing from any given feature of the outcome will not add up.
Here, I will discuss some of the implications of these claims.
Again, as I will explain, one natural aspiration we might have for a
theory of collective reasons is to help support the idea that we should
contribute to good causes even when our own contribution would not
make a difference. However, I will argue that our general collective rea-
sons to do good might never affect what I ought to do. Still, I will argue,
this does notmean that these reasons are unimportant. Finally, I will show
that unlike our general reasons to do good, other kinds of collective rea-
sons can have implications for what individuals ought to do.
Do Our Reasons to Do Good Ever Affect What I Ought to Do?
It might be thought that if we accept the idea that groups have reasons
for action, and that individual members have reasons to do their parts,
this must have implications for how individuals should act in one wide-
spread and highly important type of case: cases in which we can together
do good, or make things better in some way. After all, in many such cases,
people are often troubled by the thought that their own contribution
might not make any difference.34 But it might be suggested that we can
address this concern by appealing to the effects of what we together do.35
As I have argued, we have reasons to do what would make outcomes better
not only as individuals, but also as a group. While my contribution might
make no difference, I might be participating in a joint act that makes a
big difference. And if we have reasons to act in some way, I have argued,
then this can give me a reason to do my part.
However, I will now argue that if my proposed principle of group-
based reasons is correct, then at least when others are willing to agree to
certain courses of action, our general collective reasons to make out-
comes better will in fact never affect what I ought to do, whether or not
34. See Jonathan Glover and M. J. Scott-Taggart, “It Makes No Difference Whether or
Not I Do It,”Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 49 (1975): 171–209;
Shelly Kagan, “Do I Make a Difference?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (2011): 105–141;
and Julia Nefsky, “Consequentialism and the Problem of Collective Harm: A Reply to
Kagan,”Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (2011): 364–95.
35. Kagan mentions such a suggestion in “Do I Make a Difference?,” 112–13.
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my contribution would make a difference. In contrast, I will argue in the
next section that other kinds of collective reasons can affect what I ought
to do. These arguments rely on a distinction between what I will call
“agent- and act-neutral” reasons, which include our reasons to do good,
from “agent- and act-relative” reasons. Whereas our collective agent- and
act-neutral reasons will not affect what I ought to do, I will argue, our
agent- and act-relative reasons will.
I will start by explaining what I mean by the distinction between
these different kinds of reasons. Whenever someone has a reason to act
in some way, I will assume, we can speak of this reason as deriving from
some feature of the “outcome” of that act, very broadly construed. For
example, an agent might have a reason to act in such a way that some-
one’s life is saved, that that very agent is benefitted, or that that act is the
fulfillment of a promise. A reason is agent-relative, in my sense, when it
derives from a feature that involves the agent as such, and can be spec-
ified only using terms like “that agent”; otherwise, it is agent-neutral. For
example, an agent’s reason to act in such a way that that very agent is
benefitted would be agent-relative, whereas a reason to act in such a way
that someone’s life is saved would be agent-neutral. A reason is act-relative,
in my sense, when it derives from a feature of the outcome of an act that
involves that very act as such and can be specified only using terms like
“that act”; otherwise, it is act-neutral. For example, a reason to act in such
a way that that act is the fulfillment of a promise would be act-relative,
whereas the other two examples would be act-neutral.36
In what follows, I will assume that our general collective reasons to
make outcomes better are agent- and act-neutral, such as reasons to act
in such a way that someone’s life is saved. (We might also have more
specific agent- or act-relative collective reasons to do good, such as rea-
sons to benefit people to whom our group has special ties.) With this as-
sumption in place, we can now explore how such reasons might bear on
what individual members of the group ought to do.
Consider any feature of the outcome of our act which might pro-
vide us with a general collective reason to make outcomes better. Now,
this feature will either depend on what I do, or it will not.
Suppose first that some such feature does depend on what I do. For
example, suppose that someone’s life will be saved if we together under-
take some rescue mission, and that this person’s life will not be saved if
I fail to do my part. Now, if we act in this way, then, since this feature is
36. It is important to note that reasons can be act-neutral, in my sense, even when they
derive from features that refer to act types. For example, a reason to act in such a way that
lying is minimized would be act-neutral, since this feature does not refer to the very act
under consideration. In contrast, a reason not to act in such a way that this act would be a
lie would be act-relative.
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agent- and act-neutral, it can be described not only as a feature of the
outcome of our act, but also as a feature of the outcome of my own act.
However, as I have been assuming, and as many people believe, we
already have our own individual reasons to do good. If so, then this fea-
ture will also give me an independent individual reason to act in this way.
In that case, since my group-based reason to do my part and my personal
reason to act in this way derive from the very same feature of the outcome,
our proviso against double-counting will prevent these reasons from add-
ing up.
Suppose next that some feature of the outcome of our act does not
depend on what I do. For example, suppose that someone’s life will be
saved regardless of whether I do my part in a joint rescue mission, or act
in any other way. In that case, we could defensibly claim that this feature
will not already have given me a personal reason to act in the relevant
way, since what I do will not affect this feature. So this feature will give me
a nonredundant group-based reason to domy part in our rescuemission.
However, if this feature does not depend on what I do, then it will
also be a feature of the outcome of what we will be doing if I act in any
other way. So this feature will also give me an equally strong reason to do
my part in these alternative courses of action, so long as others are will-
ing to agree to these courses of action. (Note that such an agreement
would not change what any of them would be doing, but would merely
determine whether our activity will count as an intentional group act.)
But this means that I will have a new group-based reason for each of the
options open to me. Since these reasons will cancel each other out, they
will not make a difference to which of these options I ought to do.
Thus, our general collective reasons to make outcomes better will
never make a difference to what I ought to do, as long as others are
agreeable.
Note that if it turns out that my reasons to do my part in making
outcomes better do not depend on whether our group act would be in-
tentional, then we could extend this argument even to cases where others
are not willing to agree to alternative courses of action. In this case, we
could conclude that our general collective reasons to do good will never
make a difference to what I ought to do, period.
For many people, such a conclusion might seem to render every-
thing that I have said irrelevant. Many people accept
Act consequentialism: Each person always ought to do whatever
makes things go best.
I have argued that groups, as well as individuals, have reasons to do what
makes outcomes better. Some act consequentialists might accept this
claim. And since many act consequentialists also believe that our only
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reasons for action are reasons to do what makes outcomes better, these
people might adopt the stronger claim that
Each group always ought to do whatever makes things go best.
They could thus become collective consequentialists. But if it’s true that our
collective reasons to make outcomes better can never make a difference
to what I ought to do, then these people would not need to revise their
claims about what each person ought to do. And since my claims would
then have no implications for what each of us ought to do, they might
take these claims to have no practical significance.37
However, even if my claims have no implications for what individ-
uals ought to do, they will still have implications for what groups ought
to do. And I can’t see any reason to claim that what groups ought to do is
important only insofar as it affects what individuals ought to do.
In addition, even if accepting collective consequentialism would not
require us to revise act consequentialism, whether we follow this theory
could make a big difference to how much good we will do. Once again,
recall Gibbard’s Case. Such cases may be very common. If we act in ac-
cordance with collective consequentialism, then we will do B in these
cases, and together produce the best outcome. We will then also be sat-
isfying act consequentialism, since we will each be doing the most good
we can, given what the other is doing. But if we only want to satisfy act
consequentialism, then we could instead both do A, even though this will
only produce the second-best outcome. For again, if we both do A, it will
also be true that each of us will be doing themost good we can, given what
the other is doing. Therefore, if we only follow act consequentialism, we
might make things much worse than they could be.38
Agent- and Act-Relative Reasons
I have argued that our collective reasons to do good will never make a
difference to what I ought to do, at least as long as others are agreeable.
Even so, I claimed, it is important to recognize these reasons. However, I
will now argue that there can also be cases in which collective reasons
canmake a difference to what I ought to do. In particular, I will argue that
our agent- and act-relative collective reasons, unlike our agent- and act-
neutral reasons to do good, can affect what individuals ought to do.
As I argued, when I have reasons to domypart in virtue of some good
feature of the outcome that we would together produce, and when this
37. As Julia Nefsky writes, “What does the claim that the group did wrong amount to? If
it does not say that any individual ought, or even had reason, to have acted otherwise, then
it doesn’t seem to be a normative claim at all” (“The Morality of Collective Harm” [PhD
diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2012], 7–8).
38. Donald Regan makes this point inUtilitarianism and Co-operation, chap. 2.
980 Ethics July 2016
This content downloaded from 132.174.255.003 on June 22, 2016 13:47:32 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
feature will not be produced regardless of what I do, then I may already
have personal reasons to produce the very same feature, and so the pro-
viso against double-counting will prevent these reasons from adding up.
This is because these reasons derive from the very same feature or fea-
tures of the outcome.
However, some features of an outcome cannot be produced by a
group and by an individual at the same time. Again, some features of the
outcome of an act involve the agent, or the act, as such. For example, if
we together lie, we will have acted in such a way that this very group agent
will have lied, and that this very group act was a lie. But I could never act
in such a way that this very group agent will have lied, or that this very
group act was a lie, since I am not the same as the group, and since my
acts are never the same as the group’s acts.39
Therefore, if groups have any reasons for action deriving from fea-
tures of the outcome that involve the agent or the act as such, then these
features will never apply to individuals. And since the proviso against
double-counting only applies to reasons which derive from the very same
feature of the outcome, this proviso will not prevent my reasons to par-
ticipate deriving from a group’s agent- or act-relative reasons from mak-
ing a difference to what I ought to do.
For example, recall Firing Squad. As I argued earlier, it is hard to
explain on purely individualistic grounds why, in participating in a firing
squad, we are doing anything seriously wrong. After all, neither of us is
hastening our victim’s death. So this case, I argued, supports the idea
that we have collective reasons not to kill. And if we agree to shoot our
victim, and you will do your part, then my principle of group-based rea-
sons implies that I will have a group-based reason not to shoot. And since
this reason derives from a fact about our group act, and notmy individual
part, it will not be neutralized by the double-counting proviso. Therefore,
the appeal to collective reasons might also help us to explain why we
would each be doing something seriously wrong.
Next, suppose again that we are in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. This case,
I argued, supports the idea that we have collective reasons to do what
would be better for each of us. If we agree to benefit each other, and you
will do your part, thenmy principle of group-based reasons implies that I
will have a group-based reason to benefit you. And since this reason
derives from a fact about us, the members of the very group which is
acting, it will not be neutralized by the proviso.
Now, as I mentioned earlier, it is very plausible that I already have
some reason to act in this way merely in virtue of the fact that it would
39. To be clear, I am not claiming that an individual cannot affect what a group does. I
mean only that reasons to perform a particular act deriving from features involving the
agent or the act as such could not apply to two different agents at the same time.
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make you better off. But many people also believe that our purely al-
truistic reasons to help other people are weaker than our reasons to take
care of ourselves. Therefore, if the net cost to me of benefitting you
would be significant, my altruistic reasons might not be enough to out-
weigh my own self-interested reasons. However, once we add my group-
based reason to do my part in a course of action that would be better for
both of us, this might tip the scales. It might be because of this group-
based reason that I ought to benefit you, even though doing so would be
worse for me.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have argued that there are things that we together have reasons to do.
In particular, I have argued, groups of people have reasons of some of
the same kinds as those which individuals have. As Gibbard’s Case, the
Firing Squad, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma suggest, groups as well as in-
dividuals have reasons to make outcomes better, to avoid harming oth-
ers, and to benefit themselves.
I next discussed what this means for what we each ought to do. I
proposed that if some fact about our acting in some way gives us a reason
to act in this way, and the others will do their parts, then I also have a
reason to do my part. This view, I argued, can avoid unacceptable im-
plications in noncooperative contexts, can allow for independent indi-
vidual reasons, and can avoid an objectionable kind of double-counting.
I then discussed what these claims imply. I first argued that our
general collective reasons to make outcomes better might never affect
what each of us ought to do, but that they matter nonetheless. Finally, I
showed that other collective reasons might never affect what individuals
ought to do.
Many philosophers have argued that we should care less about
ourselves and those who are closest to us, and more about other people,
including the distant poor, and about animals. But it is not enough to
rethink the limits of our concern. We should also rethink the limits of
the unit of agency from which we assess what to do.
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